Financialization, inequality and fiscal tightening: not so ambiguous in the data

Alex Izurieta, Pierre Kohler and Juan Pizarro

G-24 Workshop on Growth and Reducing Inequality

ILO Headquarters, 5-6 September 2017, Geneva

Limits of financialization and inequality were spotted early on


- CP Kindleberger: spectacular booms, credit squeezes, market crashes and debt depression
- JM Keynes: under-consumption and speculation
- HP Minsky: financial innovation, de-regulation, stability and instability
- JK Galbraith: financial euphoria/dementia, mass disillusion, crash and desperation, social and economic damage
- More recent academic papers have revisited the empirical and theoretical links between financialization, inequality, instability and the fiscal stance

(See forthcoming Trade and Development Report 2017, chapter 5)

This study widens the scope:

- Global databases: financialization measures
 (BoPS, IFS, bank's databases), income distribution
 (GICP), fiscal variables (UNSD and GFS), fiscal stance (UN GPM)
- **Finding 1:** Financialization leads to worsening income distribution
- Finding 2: Financialization induces adjustments in the fiscal stance
- Finding 3: Trade and investment agreements accelerate the pace of financialization... and its consequences

Global stylized patterns



Exh1a: financialization and the Gini

Number of obs = 2776

FINANCIALIZATION & INCOME DISTRIBUTION: impact on GINI

```
Sample (unbalanced) 1970 - 2015
                                                   F(5, 2770) =
                                                                  795.47
                                                  Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                   R-squared = 0.5827
                                                   Root MSE
                                                                  .17283
                          Robust
                  Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| Variable definitions
      lgini
               .0181688 .0039979 4.54 0.000
lfinancratio
                                                    financialization ratio
lgdppcrworld |
              -.0172307
                             .004 -4.31 0.000
                                                    relative income p.c.
      lagtr |
              -.0792156
                         .0113251 -6.99 0.000
                                                    total govt expenditure
  developed |
              -.2420584
                          .0130103
                                    -18.61 0.000
                                                    developed ctry dummy
 developing |
                .1078232
                          .0115554
                                      9.33 0.000
                                                    developing ctry dummy
                           .01788
              -.9416224
                                   -52.66
                                           0.000
                                                    const (adjusted below)
      _cons
```

[cross section weights skipped]

GLS regression, cross section weights

Exh1b: financialization and the 'Palma ratio'

FINANCIALIZATION & INCOME DISTRIBUTION: impact on 'Palma Ratio'

GLS regression, cross section weights Number of obs = 2780 Sample (unbalanced) 1970 - 2015 F(5, 2774) = 913.53 Prob > F = 0.0000 R-squared = 0.5845

Root MSE = .39587

 lpalmaratio 	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	Variable definitions
lfinancratio lgdppcrworld lagtr developed developing _cons	.0546674 0516157 1356746 4972591 .3271738 .694767	.0094223 .0094856 .028743 .0280602 .0271956 .0423243	5.80 -5.44 -4.72 -17.72 12.03 16.42	0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000	financialization ratio relative income p.c. total govt expenditure developed ctry dummy developing ctry dummy const (adjusted below)

[cross section weights skipped]

Exh2a: financialization and government expenditure in G & S

G	3(-)								
	unit root test				Fisher	ADF	value 422.1	probabilit 0.000	
	coefficients			log(G(-1))	coeff -0.223 0.193	t-stat 7.7 3.9	.,	ection nt revenue	
				/VV\$(-1))	-0.006 0.007	2.3	external lia exchange		
			i	og(rx(-1)) g(VV(-1))	0.034 0.226	3.3 7.5	real excha real GDP	I	
	statistics	constant se	value -0.367 0.051	t-stat 3.4	residua	ıl ar(1)	value 0.333	t-stat 6.6	
	fixed effects								
	IN	0.09058 0.04133 0.03021 0.01327 0.00091 -0.00912 -0.04190 -0.09615	RU TR	0.06063 0.03606 0.02668 0.01152 -0.00067 -0.01492 -0.04930 -0.10037	OAM	0.05729 0.03481 0.02583 0.01136 -0.00237 -0.03009 -0.06286	ZA OWA DE OAF OEA	0.03362 0.02008	

Exh2b: financialization and government transfers and subsidies

YGTI Transfers and interest dlog(YGTI)							
unit root test				Fisher	ADF	value 618.1	probabilit 0.000
coefficients			YGTI(-1)) YGR(-1))	coeff -0.057	t-stat 4.4	descriptio error corre	I
		d(I	LX\$/VV\$)	-0.082	8.0	capital inf	ows
			dlog(vv) d(NU/NL)	0. 654 1.778	7.5 6.8	change in	vth unemployn
statistics	constant se	value 0.034 0.142	t-stat 0.5	residua	ıl ar(1)	value -0.051	t-stat 1.2
OCA	0.04093 0.02237 0.01960 0.00842 0.00319 -0.00877 -0.02923 -0.04532	SA	0.03711 0.02207 0.01725 0.00773 0.00204 -0.01124 -0.03153 -0.05132	OPA	0.02393 0.02070 0.01140 0.00593 -0.00033 -0.01660 -0.03943	DE ONA ONA CA OSA ID	0.02029 0.01006

Exh2c: financialization and government revenues

YGR Government revenue dlog(YGR/VV)								
unit root test				Fisher	ADF	value 594.3	probabilit 0.000	
coefficients	I	og(YGR(-1	I)/VV(-1)) (B\$////¢)	coeff -0.098	t-stat 4.6 2.5	descriptio	ection	
			X\$/VV\$)	-0.024	2.3	capital inf		
			og(rx(-1)) dlog(VV)	0.040 0.800	1.9		ange rate c	
statistics	constant se	value -0.128 0.065	t-stat 4.6	residua	al ar(1)	value 0.145	t-stat 3.8	
OCR OAF	0.06912 0.04454 0.03740 0.01944 -0.00203 -0.01180 -0.04691 -0.08696	KR OEA	0.06080 0.04068 0.03149 0.01212 -0.00218 -0.02076 -0.06073 -0.08762	OEU JP OWA SA MX	0.05322 0.03990 0.02661 0.00226 -0.00640 -0.02264 -0.07613	OPA US TR ONA OAM	0.03811	

Exh2d: financialization and indirect tax rates

rtx	Indirect taxes	less subsidie	es dlog((1+rtx/100)				
	unit root test		a.og		Fisher	ADF	value 500.9	probabilit 0.000
	coefficients		log(1th	v/ 1)/100\	coeff	t-stat	descriptio	- 11
	d((IL	PIP\$(-1)+IL		~ ~ / ~ ~ ~ ~ /	0.005	2.3	portfolio ir	
		XE\$		\$/(rx*VV))	-0.013 -0.026	1.9 2.6	energy ex change in	ports energy exp
	statistics	constant se	value 0.011 0.010	t-stat 5.9	residua	ıl ar(1)	value 0.159	ll ll
	MX AF OEA	0.00334	OCR JP OWA	0.00735 0.00326 0.00187 -0.00033 -0.00114 -0.00228 -0.00391 -0.00795	ZA KR	0.00518 0.00305 0.00183 -0.00066 -0.00191 -0.00257 -0.00396	EU DE CN OEU OAF	0.00291 0.00004 -0.00084 -0.00192 -0.00322

Exh3a: trade & investment agreements and financialization

TRADE AND INVESTMENT TREATIES & FINANCIALIZATION: impact after 'signature'

Root MSE = .40459

lfinancratio	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t 	P> t	Variable definitions
gdppcrworld_1 exportsr_1 dlapt0_2 trades_1 bits_usa bits_fra bits_ita	.0304728 .6083748 .1021429 .7910286 .0697463 .1589512 .1974082	.0014275 .2371264 .0303271 .1462133 .03871	21.35 2.57 3.37 5.41 1.80 4.61 6.46	0.000 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.000	relative income p.c. export ratio on GDP GDP growth rate trade in services share BIT w/US entry in force BIT w/FR entry in force BIT w/UK entry in force
bits_jpn	.1637967	.0423554	3.87	0.000	BIT w/JP entry in force

[cross section weights skipped]

Exh3b: trade & investment agreements and financialization

TRADE AND INVESTMENT TREATIES & FINANCIALIZATION: impact after 'entry in force' GLS regression, cross section weights Number of obs = 3657 Sample (unbalanced) 1972 - 2015 F(118, 3538) = 157.29Prob > F = 0.0000R-squared = 0.8252Root MSE = .40354 Robust lfinancratio Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| Variable definitions .0014144 21.78 gdppcrworld_1 .0308034 0.000 relative income p.c. .5287 .237204 2.23 0.026 exportsr_1 export ratio on GDP dlapt0_2 .110758 .0294811 3.76 0.000 GDP growth rate trade in services share trades 1 7751359 .1473021 5.26 0.000 pitef_usa | .0754451 .0336267 2.24 0.025 BIT w/US entry in force .1599907 5.31 0.000 bitef fra | 0301323 BIT w/FR entry in force bitef_qbr .23835 .034085 6.99 0.000 BIT w/UK entry in force

2.67

0.008

BIT w/JP entry in force

0441523

[cross section weights skipped]

.1179003

bitef_jpn

Reverting financialization and its consequences: policy options

- Financial re-regulation
- Income distribution and employment policies
- Proactive fiscal stance
- Cautious approach to trade and investment agreements