

Toward Development-Centered Climate Policy at the International Monetary Fund

OVERVIEW

GLOBAL EXPERTS

Intergovernmental Group of 24

Vulnerable Group of 20 Ministers of Finance

African Economic Research Consortium

Centre for Social and Economic Progress

Boston University Global Development Policy Center

Macro and Green Finance Lab, National School of Development, Peking University

United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean

WITH A COMMON VISION

Utilizing rigorous, empirical research to advance a development-centered approach to climate change at the IMF.

The IMF supporting a globally coordinated response is vital to achieving resilient, just transitions to a low-carbon economy.

IMPACT



Advancing empirical research to inform a development-centered approach to climate policy at the IMF.

Engaging in policy dialogue with IMF staff, leadership and key stakeholders through strategic briefings and published commentary.

Establishing a global narrative in top publications (*Financial Times, Project Syndicate*) + with key leadership, including US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen.

BY THE NUMBERS

137+
MEDIA
MENTIONS

22 PUBLICATIONS

608
WEBINAR
ATTENDEES

9,166
WEB VIEWS

PUBLISHED COMMENTARIES

THEISSUE


Why a development-centered approach is important:

Inaction by the world's major carbon emitters will have disproportionately higher costs on developing countries.

Poor and climate vulnerable countries need immediate focus on adaptation and resilience.

Growth-enhancing structural transformation will need to be the cornerstone of all mitigation, adaptation & resilience strategies.


The Uneven Cost of Climate Impacts



- Damage, % GDP
- Deaths, One-Hundredths % Population
- Number of Disasters by Year


Source: EM-DAT, average 1980-2020. IMF country classification.

Current Pledges and Emissions Pathways



Source: International Energy Agency

Effect of 1°C Increase in Temperature on Real per Capita Output at the Country Level, with Countries **Rescaled in Proportion** to their Population



An IMF climate strategy should address:

Global & national macroeconomic implications of climate risk

Global & coordinated national policy frameworks

Resource mobilization for green & resilient growth

5 GUIDING PRINCIPLES & 3 ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS FOR DEVELOPMENT-CENTERED CLIMATE POLICY AT THE IMF



- Adopt the global role of addressing macroeconomic implications of climate risk, climate action & asymmetries.
- Align short-term stability concerns with long-term sustainable & resilient growth pathways.

MULTILATERAL
SURVEILLANCE &
GLOBAL LEADERSHIP

- Tailor policy advice to member country circumstances.
- Empower national & stakeholder ownership of policy.

Reconcile shared climate goals with equity & appropriate burden sharing.

BILATERAL
SURVEILLANCE &
CAPACITY BUILDING

CLIMATE-ALIGNED FINANCE TOOLKIT

LANDSCAPE

OVERVIEW

- What is the IMF doing on climate?
- How is the IMF operationalizing its climate strategy?
- How are decisions made in this process?
- What comes next?

THE IMF & CHANGE

ANTECEDENTS OF AN IMF CLIMATE STRATEGY

- Climate issues covered in outputs on ad-hoc basis for over a decade
- Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT)
- Climate considerations + "green" fiscal adjustment measures deployed in several programs:
 - - Fuel + energy subsidy reform Financial resilience building
 - Carbon taxes

Disaster clauses in debt contracts

'MACRO-CRITICAL' RISK

A part of the IMF's mandate

COMPREHENSIVE SURVEILLANCE REVIEW

MAY 2021

Includes background paper on integrating climate into Article IV reports

Staff Guidance Note forthcoming

IMF CLIMATE STRATEGY

JULY 2021

Strategy document for a systematic integration of climate into all IMF activities

Sets targets for planned outputs on climate

Climate measures that address BoP issues could further be internalized in all loan programs

IMF CLIMATE FOCUS AREAS

ADAPTATION + RESILIENCE

For countries at risk of impacts

Fiscal and monetary challenges of frequent shocks

MITIGATION

Focus on the largest emitters

Contribution to global effforts to reduce emissions

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

Macro-critical challenges for all members arising from the global transition

Focus on domestic efforts to reduce emissions

"FIRST-BEST" MITIGATION POLICY

According to the CSR Climate paper, there is "fairly robust consensus" amongst economists about the elements needed for most efficient mitigation:

Comprehensive carbon pricing

Structural policies to address market failures and facilitate structural change

PLANNED COVERAGE OF CLIMATE ISSUES

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Financial Stability Assessments for 12 countries/year, in collaboration with the World Bank.

Climate Macroeconomic Assessment Program* (CMAP) for 10 countries/year.

Single related-issue support for 87 countries/year.

Online courses on the macroeconomics of climate change for staff + policymakers.

ARTICLE IV SURVEILLANCE

Adaptation and resilience for 20 countries/year.

Mitigation (targeting largest emitters) for 7-10 countries/year.

In-depth coverage of transition management for 8-9 countries/year.

Standardized coverage of transition management for 25 countries/year.

RESEARCH

Cover in 1-2 chapters of **flagship reports**/year.

Cover in 1-2 chapters of **Regional Economic Outlook Reports**/year.

Publish 3-7 **Staff Climate Notes** yearly.

Develop models, diagnostic and analytical tools.

POLICY


Publish 1-3 **Policy Papers** each year.

Follow-up on policy papers with guidance notes and templates.

In 2022, finalize framework of qualifying reforms for the RST, with the World Bank.

Operationalize climate module in MAC-DSA.


GOVERNANCE



VOTING POWER

V20 + G-24 VOTING SHARES

20.3% COMBINED VOTING SHARE




V20 + G-24 VOTING SHARES


WITHOUT CHINA

14.2%

COMBINED VOTING SHARE



EXECUTIVE BOARD OFFICES









Both G-24 + V20



Non-G-24/V20

OFFICE IMBALANCE


COUNTRY VOTING SHARES

G-24

V20


Both G-24 + V20

Non-G-24/V20



EXECUTIVE BOARD OFFICES

G-24 + V20 VOTING WEIGHT



16.5%


VOTING SHARE OF OFFICES WHERE G-24/V20 HAVE MAJORITY


42.6%

VOTING SHARE OF OFFICES WITH SOME G-24/V20

11.8%

VOTING SHARE OF OFFICES WHERE G-24 HAS MAJORITY





Source: CEPR

POLICY AGENDA

REVIEW OF IMF QUOTAS

- Executive board will revisit adequacy of IMF quotas
- No changes to quotas and voting shares have been proposed since 2010 (implemented in 2016)
- US maintains veto over major decisions which require 85 per cent majority
- To increase resources without increasing quotas, IMF made "borrowing agreements" with specific countries
- Deadline to conclude 16th Review is December 2023

MANAGING DIRECTOR AGENDA

- Scale-up coverage of climate-related macro-critical issues
- Replenish the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust, and the for the Resilience and Sustainability Trust, including through SDR re-channeling.
- Announced proposal on "Debt-for-climate swaps" ahead of COP26, not yet released.

2022 EXECUTIVE BOARD WORK PROGRAM

Updated Guidance Note on Surveillance following Comprehensive Surveillance Review (2022)

Blueprint for all IMF surveillance for next 5-10 years
Was expected June 2022 but is delayed

Operationalizing of the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (2022)

Policy framework on qualifying reforms (draws on World Bank's Country Climate and Development Reports)

Climate module for long-term for Debt Sustainability Framework for Market Access Countries

Guidance Note

Implementation climate strategy, review of frameworks and policy papers to operationalize it

Review of the Climate Macroeconomic Assessment Program

Planned reviews FY2023: Capacity
Development Strategy and Catastrophe
Containment and Relief Trust

RESEARCH

FISCAL IMPACTS OF DECARBONIZATION

KEY FISCAL FINDINGS

IN LATIN AMERICA + THE CARIBBEAN

- Carbon taxes fall short. Declining hydrocarbon revenues are not offset by revenues from other sources, such as carbon taxes.
- for net-zero emissions scenario investments would lead to explosive debt levels, reaching up to 200% of GDP in some countries.

IN INDIA

- **2x defense expenditure.** Fossil fuel revenues in India are even higher than previously thought.
- Carbon taxes fall short. Similar to LAC, a carbon tax would not be sufficient to offset budgetary pressures.



POLICY LESSONS

LONG-TERM FINANCING OPTIONS

at favorable terms and conditions are needed to help achieve a low-carbon transitions

GREEN PUBLIC INVESTMENTS

have large multiplier effects, and the IMF should experiment with building such multipliers into its analytic work and advising countries on how to both identify and budget for green public investments.



TRANSITION SPILLOVER RISKS & IMF SURVEILLANCE

KEY SPILLOVER FINDINGS

ON CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS

- **Disproportionate impact** faced by countries that rely on carbon-intensive exports to the EU.
- Welfare losses in trade-exposed countries range from \$1-5 billion. Mozambique's economy would shrink by 2.5% due to decreased demand.
- CBAM, at its broadest implementation, would result in an annual welfare gain in developed countries of \$141 billion, while developing countries suffer a loss of \$106 billion compared to the baseline scenario.



KEY SPILLOVER FINDINGS

ON PHASING OUT COAL

- A 6% drop. A decrease in coal demand from China could translate to a 6% drop in Indonesia's GDP by 2050.
- Sweeping impact. Indonesia's Employment, balance of payments and debt would also be impacted.

ON DEBT SUSTAINABILITY

Climate shocks might significantly affect public debt trajectories and increase the probability of incurring a stress event.



POLICY LESSONS

MACRO-CRITICAL CLIMATE RISKS

should be incorporated into the IMF's toolkit. This paper provides a framework to identify channels of spillover risk and makes quantitative assessments which the IMF can use in FSAPs.

ASSESS + MONITOR CBAMS

on balance of payment positions of vulnerable countries. It should take initiative to support global policy coordination to address spillover effects of CBAMs.

BUILD ANALYTIC CAPACITY

and provide policy advice to member countries to design policy responses to spillovers.

IMPROVE DSAS

to incorporate climate risks.



UPCOMING RESEARCH



QUESTIONS?

